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The rapid globalization of the world economy has increased the need for a knowledge base of
reliable socio-cultural differences in perceptions, values and ways of thinking about new food
technologies. Awareness of socio-cultural differences is important because collaborative efforts
to deal with food hazards presuppose some understanding of where, how and why the viewpoints
of various stakeholders may differ. In the present paper factors that influence public perceptions
of genetically-modified (GM) food are discussed, with a special focus on the unique
circumstances of populations in the USA, Europe and developing countries. It is argued that
effective communication and decision making about the risk of GM food depends critically on
understanding how socio-cultural groups differ in their values and in the way they deal with the
risks and benefits of new technologies. The implications of psychological aspects of perceived risk
(including the roles of qualitative dimensions of risk, world views and trust) for public acceptance
of new food technologies are highlighted.
Genetically-modified food: Culture: Risk perception: Psychology
BSE, bovine spongiform encephalopathy; GE, genetic engineering; GM, genetically modified; vCJD, variant Creutzfeld-Jacob disease.The present paper examines the role of socio-cultural factors
in the perceived risk of genetically-modified (GM) food.
The importance of social and cultural dimensions of risk
debates has been underscored already by the different
perspectives that experts and lay individuals bring to the
negotiating table. Members of our scientific culture have
long been frustrated by the so-called irrational perspectives
and behaviours that they believe are displayed by members
of the lay culture. And lay individuals have often castigated
scientists for their apparent lack of understanding of what is
most important in decisions about potentially risky technol-
ogies. The debate about GM food has arrived on stage,
however, just as the world trade economy is accelerating
toward globalization. So, unlike previous debates about
other new technologies, the expert–lay divide over GM food
is compounded by the international context in which the
technical and ethical complexities of genetic engineering
(GE) are being debated.
In any domain, effective risk communication and
decision making depend on understanding public percep-
tions of risk. And understanding public perceptions of risk
depends critically on understanding the socio-cultural
factors involved. Yet, many individuals involved in policy
development, decision making and risk communication
about GE come from backgrounds of biological science
rather than social science. Knowledge gaps about other
individuals’ cultural values (especially values underlying
perceptions of risk) make it necessary to search for a
framework by which we can at least know what we don’t
know, and anticipate what happens when different socio-
cultural groups come together to make decisions about GE.
The present paper shows how research from the fields of
human judgement, decision making and risk perception can
be drawn on to help us understand national differences in
cognition and behaviour.
Interest in cross-cultural comparisons typically stems
from the premise that different cultural contexts influence
individuals’ cognitions and behaviours. At the outset,
therefore, it is necessary to define what is meant by ‘cultural
differences’. Commonly, cultural differences are viewed as
attitudinal or behavioural divergences associated with
differences in stable social structures, processes and/or
values. In other words, cultural differences relate to the
shaping of individual and collective behaviour by a set of
common characteristics, including geography, climate,
history, economics, politics and psychology (Tse et al. 1988;
Weber & Hsee, 1999). Cultural differences often follow
national boundaries, although not always, as has been
suggested already with the reference to scientists and lay
individuals as different cultural groups. The main focus of
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the present paper is on nations as proxies for cultures, but
this approach belies the complex mix of intra-national
cultures that contribute to policy development. The goal here
is simply to explicate socio-cultural differences in risk
perceptions and behaviours, rather than to prescribe specific
policy options for any particular regions or groups.
Understanding the potential for socio-cultural differ-
ences in risk debates is important for several reasons.
Perhaps most critical is the rapid globalization of the world
economy, which has increased the need for a knowledge
base of reliable cross-cultural differences in perceptions,
values and ways of thinking. As Hofstede (1984) stresses:
‘The survival of mankind will depend to a large extent on
the ability of people who think differently to act together.
International collaboration presupposes some under-
standing of where others’ thinking differs from ours’. An
astute cross-cultural understanding is particularly important
as global trade in new biotechnologies increases and inter-
national governance policies are developed. Different
cultural groups are likely to evaluate and to deal with the
risks and benefits of new technologies such as GE in
diverse ways because of tendencies toward different
decision styles and values. As a result they may develop
different risk-management policies. Cross-cultural differ-
ences in policies can create misunderstanding and conflict
when trying to weigh up the complex array of health,
environmental and social benefits and risks faced in the
international exchange of GM foods and crops for research
and commercial development or consumption.
In short, understanding cultural differences is critical for
accurately interpreting information and events in different
cultures, which in turn is crucial for facilitating economic
and social development in a way that appropriately balances
the costs and benefits of new technologies in the unique
environmental and human health contexts of different
countries. Insightful interpretation of information and events
is also fundamental to the development of creative solutions
to difficult environmental and social decisions, communi-
cations and risk-management issues.
The present paper begins with some background to the
role of socio-cultural factors as determinants of public
risk perceptions. Then, cross-national differences in
reactions to GE are examined. Finally, cultural theory and
the implications of individual differences in world views
are discussed.
Understanding risk
Traditional solutions to conflicts over the risks of new tech-
nologies have often involved calls for better technical
analysis and expert oversight via small centralized groups
charged with creating uniformity and rationality in highly
technical areas of risk management. Proponents of this
approach argue that an expert group is needed to ensure that
regulations are based on ‘sound science’ and effectively
reduce significant risks at reasonable costs. This approach
reflects the traditionally narrow view of risk, which custom-
arily defines risk as ‘the chance of injury, damage or loss’
(Webster, 1983).
Recently, however, social scientists have rejected this
notion of ‘real’ or ‘objective’ risk, and argue instead that
risk is inherently subjective (Krimsky & Golding, 1992;
Slovic, 1992); i.e. risk cannot be measured ‘out there’,
independent of our minds and cultures. Rather, risk is a
social construct, meaning different things to different
individuals. While technical analysis is vital for informed
and accountable risk decisions, trying to address risk
controversies primarily with more science that fails to
reflect the context-dependent and culturally-dependent
nature of risk is likely to exacerbate conflict (Slovic &
Gregory, 1999).
Several decades of psychometric research (see Slovic,
1987) have shown that public conceptions of risk are
complex and guided by qualitative features of hazards, or
what could be called the ‘personality’ characteristics of
hazards. In essence, there are two main qualitative dimen-
sions that seem to drive risk perceptions: unknown risk
(known v. unknown); dread risk (not dreaded v. dreaded).
The unknown risk factor reflects the extent to which a
hazard is unknown, unobservable, unfamiliar and has
delayed consequences. The dread risk factor reflects the
extent to which a hazardous activity or technology is seen as
dreaded, uncontrollable, fatal, not equitable, high risk to
future generations, not easily reduced, involuntary and has
catastrophic potential.
One illustration of the importance of unknown and
dread characteristics in the perception of food risks
comes from the case of British beef. Since the mid-1990s
British beef has had features of unknown risk through its
association with ‘mad-cow’ disease or bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Creutzfeld-Jacob disease
(vCJD) in man. Many aspects of BSE in general, and the
relationship between BSE and vCJD in particular remain
unclear. Science still does not understand BSE or vCJD
adequately (there is still no readily-available vaccine or cure
for either prion), and farmers and suppliers often do not
know what parts of animals may end up in the feed or
supplements given to cows, let alone to human subjects.
Further, the effects of a disease such as BSE in cows or
vCJD in human subjects are latent and not easily observed at
first (Granot, 1999).
British beef also has elements of high dread risk;
individual consumers cannot easily control the spread of
contamination, and symptoms of BSE and vCJD are horrific
and potentially fatal. The risk is also involuntary; unless
recipients make their own meat products from their own
cows they know have not been fed anything containing
the meat, bone, fat or nervous tissue derived from other
ruminants, they have little choice in the matter (except to
stop eating beef and beef products altogether). Also, the
meat used in human food products seems to come from an
uncontrollable source; i.e. meat is delivered by strangers,
and is processed, stored and distributed by large companies,
none of which can be influenced to any great extent by an
individual consumer.
Similarly, public opposition to GM foods can be under-
stood from what we know about characteristics of hazards
that lead to high risk perceptions. Consider how GE appears
on unknown and dread risk characteristics. First, GE
presents unknown risk. To some individuals GM foods
seem very risky because they are based on relatively new
science (so scientists do not have enough knowledge to
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estimate the risks accurately). Furthermore, the inadvertent
introduction of harmful changes in DNA structure is not
immediately obvious (the effects are delayed). And finally,
consumers do not necessarily know when they are exposed,
because they are not well-informed about which products
contain GM ingredients and GE is not obvious to the casual
observer. In contrast, GM medicines are seen as less risky
because they are targeted at a very specific audience who is
likely to be well informed (by someone considered trust-
worthy, such as a primary-care doctor) and expecting an
observable effect (Marris, 2000).
GM foods also have features of dread risk. Food growers
are the ones who decide whether to use GM seeds or other
products, so consumers do not necessarily have a choice
(involuntary exposure). Many individuals are exposed to
GM foods (signalling global catastrophic potential), and the
risks and benefits are not fairly distributed (currently the
benefits are greatest for farmers and GM food manufacturers
rather than consumers). Furthermore, children are heavy
consumers of some products (e.g. milk), making parents
especially sensitive to potential harm to future generations.
In contrast, GM medicines have less dread risk associated
with them because exposure is usually voluntary and some
potential benefit to the patient is anticipated.
In short, while scientists may measure risk primarily as a
function of probability, public perceptions of risk incorporate
many other non-technical factors (Slovic, 1987).
Benefits, risks, trust and decisions in different countries
The trans-Atlantic debate
The sharpest policy conflict regarding GE has occurred
across the Atlantic, between the USA and European
countries. Initially, GM foods were embraced by American
consumers and farmers. The use of GE in agriculture was
perceived as presenting several distinct benefits, including
enhanced farming productivity, reduced pesticide use and
run-off, tailored micronutrient enrichment of food and
reduced food costs and other attractions for consumers.
That perception changed dramatically, however, when a
study published in the prestigious journal Nature suggested
that GE may have harmful effects (Losey et al. 1999).
Simultaneously, American farmers found that their export
markets were drying up as European consumers started
boycotting GM foods. Since then, the tide has turned rapidly
and non-GM ingredients have been emphasised in US
marketing and advertising campaigns.
In striking contrast to the initial acceptance of GM food
in the USA, the history of opposition to GM products began
much earlier in European countries, where there was
relatively little public discussion about the results of field
trials and risk-management policies. Vehement public
opposition through Europe has led the EU to suspend the
introduction of new GM crops pending legislation that may
take several years to be finalised.
To some extent, the trans-Atlantic debate seems to have
been about economic, environmental and health risks. For
instance, there have been arguments about what food safety
or trade restrictions to place on GM crops or products, what
labelling to require and what patent protection to allow.
However, a closer look suggests that there are clear signs
that the trans-Atlantic debate is not only about basic health
or wealth or environmental protection. Rather, the oppo-
sition in Europe to American GM exports is also determined
importantly by cultural values that reflect sensitivities to
dread and unknown risk.
One illustration is the effort, for instance in France, to
reassert ‘culinary sovereignty’ in response to the erosion of
traditional food and eating habits due to the invasion from
America’s fast food culture (Klee, 1999). If one culture is
feeling invaded by another it will elicit a sense of dread risk
to the extent that the invasion is uncontrollable, involuntary,
a threat to future generations and inequitable (in that the
risks are incurred by the invaded and the benefits are
incurred by the invader).
Furthermore, the idea that transgenesis is inherently
wrong has been expressed by several religious bodies who
are worried that transgenesis will upset the natural order of
things, unleashing unknown consequences (see Bruce &
Eldridge, 2000). For instance, GM foods are considered
morally disgusting by members of the Scottish Anglican
church; moving genes between species that could never
breed normally is ‘not natural’ and likened to ‘playing god’
(Shepherd et al. 2000; see also Paarlberg, 2000).
Non-European groups have also expressed important
concerns that the idea of GE is contrary to their belief
systems. For instance, a moratorium on GM imports into
New Zealand was announced in 2000, with questions being
raised about unknown risks to Mäori cultures and their rela-
tionship with the environment, the involuntary nature of
their exposure to new technologies and products, and the
inequitable distribution of risks and benefits of imports.
Concerns related to cultural impacts come from the fact that
Mäori believe that to switch genes across species violates an
inherent wisdom in the natural order. They are concerned
about the recognition and protection of Mäori cultural,
spiritual, ethical or socio-economic values, about the
protection of the mauri (spiritual essence) of individuals,
flora, fauna, land, waterways and air, and about the preser-
vation of traditional Mäori knowledge.
Developing countries
While debate over the benefits and risks of transgenic or
GM organisms in agriculture has been intense in the rich
industrial world (primarily where biotechnology has been
developed and commercialised), the greatest human and
environmental impacts (good and bad) are arguably in the
developing world (Levidow, 1999).
The use of GM foods and crops presents several distinct
benefits to developing countries. First, remote and dis-
advantaged rural areas that were bypassed by the Green
Revolution (due to unsuitable soil, water, topography and
labour endowments) will benefit from GM crops because
they depend less on the hard-to-get hard-to-manage
‘packages’ of purchased chemical inputs. Second, addi-
tional environmental benefits arise from reduced pesticide
use through the spread of herbicide-resistant and pest-
resistant GM varieties, because there will be less run-off of
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pesticides into surface and groundwater, and reduced need
for tillage. Third, natural rural ecosystems would be under
less pressure from population-linked expansion of land
area devoted to low-productivity crop farming (especially
shifting cultivation) and livestock grazing. Fourth, human
health will benefit. Micronutrient-rich crops can be
engineered (e.g. rice can be enhanced with vitamin A to
counter eye damage among the poor), and increased farm
productivity will boost food production and lower the price
of food staples in poor countries, increasing the
consumption of food and non-food goods among the poor
(Levidow, 1999).
Despite these benefits of GM foods and crops in
developing countries, however, there is also potential for
environmental and health risks. First, developing countries
may become testing grounds for novel and potentially risky
substances that they have neither the capacity nor the
regulatory frameworks in place to deal with. Second, many
developing countries (especially in the Asia-Pacific region,
for instance) are rich in natural biological endowments and
have raised concerns about the potential of GM seeds to
increase the genetic uniformity of crops they grow and/or of
native flora. Third, cultural diversity may be threatened as
current risk analysis procedures attempt to incorporate
marginalized groups into a mainstream identity. Fourth,
there is potential for biohazards being created, such as
insect populations becoming resistant to the toxins in GM
crops or plants developing into herbicide-resistant ‘super-
weeds’. The capacity for field testing under closely
monitored conditions is potentially poorer in developing
countries than in industrialized countries. Fifth, labelling
requirements may be technically unattainable or
unaffordable in poorer countries, thus excluding them from
entering lucrative world markets for GM products that
might emerge in the future (Paarlberg, 2000).
So we are left with a complex decision scenario.
While a precautionary approach to the new technology,
such as that followed in Europe, may be affordable in
industrialized countries, the greater levels of poverty and
starvation in developing countries may make too much
precaution inappropriate. Furthermore, the scientific,
industry-friendly approach (e.g. in the USA) may be
acceptable where there is the capacity to identify and
manage the tangible and non-tangible impacts of GE, but
poorer technical and political capacities may make it more
difficult for developing countries to pursue the benefits of
GE safely and equitably (Tutangata, 1999). Given these
differences, the highly precautionary European policies
and the industry-friendly US policies regarding GE devel-
opment and regulation may be inadequately sensitive to
the unique circumstances of developing countries. Clearly,
the developing world’s needs and values (not the current
trans-Atlantic debate) should guide the formation of policy
in developing nations.
Trust
An important dimension of agency–public interaction is
public trust in regulatory and management officials. Despite
co-development of technologies used in modern crop
improvement in the USA and Europe, the very different
response of the public to GM products on the two continents
may relate to different levels of trust. In the early 1990s the
USA brought foods containing GM ingredients to market
quickly and without labels. American farmers enthusi-
astically embraced GM crops and the potential benefits they
brought. Discussions among scientists, regulators, farmers
and environmentalists led to US field tests in the mid 1980s,
from which data were shared, concerns were addressed with
more experiments and then informed decisions were made
(Beachy, 1999).
In contrast, there was no real central regulator in Europe
to green-light the technology and allay public fears.
European field tests in the early 1990s failed to engage
discussions between the public and governmental agencies.
Overall, the European public were not convinced by the US
system of regulation and approval (Beachy, 1999), and for
small farmers in particular biotechnology represented a
threat rather than an opportunity.
Public trust in food safety processes probably also played
a crucial role in Europe. Factors such as concern over
mad-cow disease highlighted to Europeans the lack of
effective and transparent regulatory oversight, and fuelled
their mistrust of government and large organizations. In the
UK, for instance, the government’s attempt to play down the
mad-cow disease crisis in the early 1990s led to trust
plummeting and risk perceptions skyrocketing, paving the
way for more generalized fear of food safety. Britain’s 1996
bout with mad-cow disease, although unrelated to GE,
weakened European confidence in regulators and industrial-
strength agriculture.
The role of trust is evident in less-industrialized
countries also. Research by Aerni (1999) on public
opposition to GM rice in the Philippines suggests that trans-
genic crops are valued less in the Philippines than in the
USA, partly because of a lack of confidence in the
regulatory institutions that promote GE. Public debate about
the acceptability of transgenic rice in the Philippines (which
has one of the best capacities for agricultural biotechnology
research in Southeast Asia) is strongly polarized. The
new technology is not favoured by non-governmental
organizations and other public interest groups, but is
favoured by Filipino scientists.
Social trust (the willingness to rely on the policies and
decisions of agencies and their employees) has been found
to be important to the perception of environmental risks and
to the acceptance of emerging technologies and environ-
mental management practices (Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995).
A lack of trust has been cited in numerous studies as a
critical factor in the gap between expert and lay assessments
of risk (Slovic, 1997). Trust has also been found to be
strongly linked to risk perceptions. For instance, Grobe et al.
(1999) found that greater trust in the US Food and Drug
Administration as a food-related information source was
related to less concern about the adverse health effects from
the use of recombinant bovine growth hormone. These
findings suggest a direct relationship between distrust in
regulatory agencies and risk perceptions.
Earle & Cvetkovich (1995) have argued that shared
values constitute the foundations of trust. If individuals’ or
institutions’ behaviour reflects shared values the character-
istics of trustworthiness will be attributed to them; the future
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individuals without their consent’) and to disagree with anti-
individualistic statements (e.g. to disagree that ‘the
government should make rules about personal risk-taking
activities’). In short, the data suggest that risk perceptions
reflect deep-seated values about technology and its impacts
on society (see also Barke et al. 1997).
Individual differences in world views are important
because they have implications for which approach to safety
standards will be supported. For example, a study by Sheehy
et al. (1996) suggested that hierarchists feel that the
complexity of biotechnology and genetic information under-
mines their ability to make informed personal decisions.
They would prefer mechanisms that draw on the experience
of experts to make decisions, rather than rely on their own
incomplete knowledge. On the other hand, egalitarians have
a strong desire to have information provided to them on
which they can base their own personal choices in the
marketplace. These individuals also want to be able to make
a risk assessment based on their individual beliefs and
preferences.
Although most focus-group participants in the Sheehy
et al. (1996) study indicated that they would like to be
involved in the decision-making process, some suggested
that they would be more willing to trust the judgement of
others. For many consumers, the judgements they are
willing to trust refer mostly to safety standards; for other
consumers this trust could be extended to include judge-
ments about ethical considerations of whether a product
should be made available on the market.
Conclusions and future directions
Failing to understand non-scientific perspectives will
inevitably lead to a communication and decision-making
breakdown. What is important to individuals from different
cultures and why it is important to them needs to be made
more salient in the GM food debate. This task cannot be
done without a systematic examination of values and views
of different cultural groups. Furthermore, international
agreements that protect vulnerable countries are essential.
While global rules should minimize national differences and
bring predictability to international trade, they should also
still allow for legitimate national differences in concerns
and priorities with regard to uptake of complex new
technologies.
So where to from here? Both hard-learned experience and
considerable research suggest that approaching risk analysis
without the involvement of the public is a doomed
enterprise. This situation exists because (1) risk decisions
are much more likely to be implemented successfully if
they have broad public support (National Research
Council, 1996), (2) the wisdom relevant to optimal
risk management is not confined to scientific specialists
and (3) from a normative viewpoint, government
should obtain the consent of the governed, who therefore
have a right to participate in decision processes (Fiorino,
1990).
Government or industry policy developers and decision
makers should take advantage of social science to anticipate
and ameliorate conflict. In particular, we need to develop a
framework for understanding cross-cultural differences
specifically with respect to the complex array of technical
and ethical issues raised by new technologies such as GE.
Furthermore, we need to begin systematically assessing
reliable cross-cultural differences in perceptions, values,
attitudes and behaviours regarding GM food, in order to fill
in current knowledge gaps and to respond dynamically to
issues encountered in international negotiations over GM
foods. If community, industry and government stakeholders
are to agree on an acceptable level of risk for specific
products or technologies, effective and responsible commu-
nication is essential. Assessment of, and communication
about, risk will only be successful if it is based on a thorough
understanding of the psychological and socio-cultural
determinants of risk.
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